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Can Regulation be as Innovative as Science and 
Technology?  The FDA’s Regulation of 
Combination Products 
Susan Bartlett Foote∗ & Robert J. Berlin∗∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
The twentieth century witnessed significant and 
continuous advances in medical product innovation, with 
breakthroughs in pharmaceutical, engineering and bioscience 
fields that revolutionized health care services.  However, with 
innovation comes potential risk.  Congress has been concerned 
about risks associated with medical products since the early 
1900s,1 and has, over time, empowered the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) to ensure that new medical products 
meet evolving standards of safety and effectiveness.  The Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) has been amended numerous 
times since the early 1900s, often in reaction to both perceived 
and real risks associated with new medical products.2  The 
result is a complex regulatory apparatus that administers a 
variety of legislative mandates specifically tailored to the 
unique features of drugs, medical devices and biologics. 
In recent years, scientific and technological advances in the 
fields of tissue engineering, cell biology, gene therapy and 
materials science, to name a few, promise breakthroughs that 
                                                 
 ∗ J.D., M.A.  Associate Professor, Division of Health Services Research 
and Policy, University of Minnesota, School of Public Health.  
 ∗∗ J.D., MPH (Epidemiology), expected 2007, Joint Degree Program in 
Law, Health & Life Sciences, University of Minnesota.  
 1. See Biologics Act of 1902, ch. 1378, 32 Stat. 728 (1902) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2000)).  Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. 
No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768, 768-70 (1906) (repealed 1938). 
 2. E.g., Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, § 16, 104 
Stat. 4511, 4526 (1990) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 353(g) (2000)); Food 
and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 
Stat. 2296 (1997) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2000)); Medical Device 
Amendments of 1976, Pub L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539, 540-42 (1976) (current 
version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-360k (2000)). 
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no longer fit the clear statutory distinctions among drugs, 
medical devices, or biologics.  These products, known as 
“combinations” because they mix attributes of drugs, biologics, 
or medical devices, challenge the FDA to adapt its regulatory 
schema to these novel combinations.3 
The purpose of this article is threefold.  First, we provide 
an overview of the innovation pipeline of combination products 
to illustrate the depth and breadth of the potential 
contributions of this field.  Second, we summarize the evolution 
of the FDA over the last one hundred years and evaluate its 
initial efforts since 1990 to accommodate combination products.  
We find that the combination product provisions in statute and 
regulation follow a sequence that includes: a focus on 
definitions to distinguish between types of products as they 
emerge, a willingness by the FDA to stretch the limits of the 
definitions as new products evolve, and congressional 
intervention, often in reaction to crises or external pressures, to 
revise old definitions to reflect changes in product types.  Third, 
we discuss why the traditional response to innovation may be 
ill-suited to the accelerated pace of the combination product 
revolution.  We evaluate the likely responses of Congress, the 
FDA, and the regulated entities to possible changes in the 
approach to combination product regulation.  We hope that our 
analysis will add to the understanding of the current 
regulatory environment and inform the on-going policy debate. 
I.  OVERVIEW OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OF 
COMBINATION PRODUCTS 
We are now in an era of tremendous innovation in medical 
products that promises to transform medicine as we know it.  
This era is also characterized by new forms of innovation.  In 
the twentieth century, there were major advancements in the 
fields of pharmaceuticals, engineered devices, and biologics.  A 
new generation of products, however, combines attributes of 
these three formerly distinct fields.  While it is impossible to 
predict with accuracy the next generation of medical product 
advances, it is clear that many will take the form of 
combination products. 
The earliest combinations involved adding a 
                                                 
 3. See, e.g., Definition of Primary Mode of Action of a Combination 
Product, 69 Fed. Reg. 25,527, 25,528-30 (proposed May 7, 2004) (to be codified 
at 21 C.F.R. pt. 3). 
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pharmaceutical agent to a therapeutic device, such as putting a 
steroid drug on a pacemaker electrode to speed healing and 
reduce scarring.4  The recently introduced drug-eluting stents 
fall into this drug-device combination category.5 
Tissue engineering and tissue replacement is a burgeoning 
area of growth that involves various combinations of biologics, 
devices, and drugs.  Scientists have found that matrix scaffolds 
can serve as a mechanical substrate for regeneration of 
cartilage.6  Adding components, such as growth factors, cells, or 
nutrients, hasten the growth of new tissue.  There are many 
applications and potential uses for tissue engineered products, 
including tissue substitutes for burns, ulcers and 
reconstruction to the development of structural tissue products, 
organs, and organ systems.7 
Another growth area for combination product research is in 
the field of gene therapy.  Cells must be targeted for the 
delivery of modified gene sequences.  Delivery mechanisms may 
include viruses (a biologic)8 or synthetics, such as natural or 
synthetic lipids or purely synthetic polymers (a device).9  Other 
drug delivery mechanisms may be device-like in nature, such 
as leads to thread through the venous system to targeted 
organs or sites within the body. 
Nanomedicine is the monitoring, repair, construction and, 
                                                 
 4. See John Carey, Combo Medicine, BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 25, 2003, 
available at http://www.keepmedia.com/pubs/businessweek/2003/03/25/18043. 
 5. See id. 
 6. Lichun Lu, et al., Biodegradable Polymer Scaffolds for Cartilage 
Tissue Engineering, CLINICAL ORTHOPEDICS & RELATED RES, Oct. 2001, at 
S251-252, available at http://gateway.ut.ovid.com/gw2/ovidweb.cgi.  
 7. See Amy J. LaForte, Bone Morphogenetic Protein Combination 
Products and Orthopedic Repair, in NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROCEEDINGS 
FROM THE WORKSHOP ON SCIENCE-BASED ASSESSMENT: ACCELERATING 
PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT OF COMBINATION MEDICAL DEVICES 15 (Bonnie A. 
Scarborough ed., 2004) [hereinafter NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL]; William 
McKay, Product Development Process for a Bone Morphogenetic Protein 
Combination Product, in NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra, at 15 ; Robert S. 
Schwartz, Drug-Eluting Stents, in NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra, at 18; H. 
Semih Oktay, Drug-Eluting Stents: Preclinical Testing Challenges, in NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra, at 19; Ronald A. Sahatjian, Taxus: A Polymer-
Based Paclitaxel-Eluting Stent, in NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra, at 20. 
 8. Lonnie D. Shea & Tiffany L. Houchin, Modular Design of Non-viral 
Vectors with Bioactive Components, 22 TRENDS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 429, 429 
(2004). 
 9. Tristan Montier et al., Non-viral Vectors in Cystic Fibrosis Gene 
Therapy: Progress and Challenges, 22 TRENDS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 586, 587 
(2004). 
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control of human biological systems at the molecular level, 
using engineered nanodevices and nanostructures.  Promising 
novel combinations in the nanotechnology pipeline include 
nanorobots that can travel through the body to find illness and 
target the delivery of drugs and biologics.10  
Microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) devices are tiny 
mechanical and electrical elements integrated onto a silicon 
chip to perform functions such as sensing.  These compact 
devices with sophisticated functionality have many potential 
biomedical uses, including precision drug delivery using 
integrated microvalves and pumps, and portable biochemical 
analysis instrumentation using microfluidic networks. 11 
Some of these innovations have already come to the 
market, but many of them are in the research and development 
phase.  The FDA has reviewed several hundred combination-
type products since the term was statutorily defined; data now 
compiled by the agency shows that there were approximately 
sixty-one requests for designation (RFD) as combination 
products between October 1, 2003 and September 30, 2004.12 
The innovative scientists and engineers in these and 
related fields face many challenges in the development of these 
products.  But they will all have to navigate through the FDA 
process.  Can regulation be as innovative as science and 
technology? 
II.  HISTORY OF REGULATORY EVOLUTION 
The over one hundred years of U.S. regulation of medical 
products provides a rich narrative history reflecting a cycle of 
scientific innovation and regulatory response.  There are 
numerous extensive analyses of this history, which we 
commend to the interested reader.13  The purpose of our 
                                                 
 10. See John Miller, Beyond Biotechnology: FDA Regulation of 
Nanomedicine, 4 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1-2 (2003). 
 11. See Yvonne Carts-Powell, Developing MEMS for Medicine, 200 OE 
REPORTS, Aug. 2000, at 
http://www.spie.org/web/oer/august/aug00/stanford.html (last visited Nov. 7, 
2004). 
 12. OFFICE OF COMBINATION PRODS., U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., FY04 
OCP REVIEW PERFORMANCE, at 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/fy04rfd.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2004).  
Thirty-four of the sixty-one products for which designation was requested were 
categorized as combination products between October 2003 and September 
2004.  Id. 
 13. See generally SUSAN BARTLETT FOOTE, MANAGING THE MEDICAL 
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cursory overview is to describe how policy adapted to new 
products.  When a new type of product is considered as a target 
for regulation, there has often been a focus on classification of 
the product type through detailed definitions.  “Definitional 
controversies are an established feature of food and drug law, 
driven by the differential treatment of the various categories of 
FDA-regulated products.”14  The agency has tended to try to 
stretch its authority to clarify gray areas as new product types 
emerge.  There often has been a congressional reaction, 
triggered by external crises or pressure, to revisit the 
definitions and amend FDA authority.  The result is a  
patchwork of legislative mandates and a silo effect, with 
differently defined products being regulated differently.  The 
following discussion elucidates this pattern for the three 
medical product categories—drugs, medical devices, and 
biologics.15 
A.  EARLY DRUG AND DEVICE REGULATION 
Public concern about fraud in the sale of food and medicine 
grew during the 1880s and 1890s in response to diseased or 
adulterated foodstuffs.  Because there were few effective drugs 
at this time, and most were not purchased directly through 
medical doctors, drugs were seen as part of food regulation.  
Many nostrums and medicines contained dangerous habit-
forming narcotics.16  Harvey W. Wiley, Chief of the Division of 
Chemistry at the Department of Agriculture, became a 
                                                 
ARMS RACE: INNOVATION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE MEDICAL DEVICE 
INDUSTRY (Univ. of Cal. Press, 1992); PETER BARTON HUTT & RICHARD A. 
MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d. ed. 1991); 
CHARLES O. JACKSON, FOOD AND DRUG LEGISLATION IN THE NEW DEAL 
(1970); Susan Bartlett Foote, Loops and Loopholes:  Hazardous Device 
Regulation Under the 1976 Medical Device Amendments to the Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 101 (1978); Henry G. Grabowski & John M. 
Verson, Consumer Protection Regulation in Ethical Drugs, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 
359 (1977); Peter Barton Hutt, A History of Government Regulation of 
Adulteration and Misbranding of Medical Devices, 44 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 
99 (1989); Vincent A. Kleinfeld, Legislative History of the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act, 1 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.Q. 532 (1946); Symposium, The New 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Legislation, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1939). 
 14. Linda R. Horton, Over-the-Counter Drug Authority Issues: Selected 
Topics, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 545, 551 (1993). 
 15. While the FDA also has regulatory power over foods, we restrict this 
analysis to drugs, biologics and devices. 
 16. Oscar E. Anderson, Pioneer Statute: The Pure Food and Drugs Act of 
1906, 13 J. PUB. L. 189, 189 (1964). 
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missionary for reform.17  The publication of Upton Sinclair’s 
The Jungle in 1905, with its graphic images of adulterated food, 
aroused the public to demand reform. 
After years of unsuccessful efforts, the first major federal 
initiative was the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906.18The law 
defined drugs as separate from food, and extended the 
definition to include not only medicines recognized by the 
United States Pharmacopoeia (USP), but also any substance 
intended for the cure, mitigation, or treatment of disease, 
bringing proprietary medicines within the scope of the law.19  
The law conferred limited authority, allowing the federal 
government the authority to seize adulterated or misbranded 
articles on the market. The Department of Agriculture, 
Division of Chemistry, was charged with enforcing the new law. 
Enforcement activities against adulterated foods and drugs 
increased throughout the 1920s.  By 1931, the FDA had been 
established within the Department of Agriculture.  Officials 
were severely handicapped in reaching the adulterated 
products because of the limitations of the seizure authority.20  
The new Roosevelt Administration supported expanding federal 
authority in 1933, although it took over five years of effort to 
enact reforms.21 
In the debates leading up to the subsequent legislation, 
there was reference, for the first time, to medical devices.  An 
FDA report in 1933 stated:  
Mechanical devices, represented as helpful in the cure of disease, may 
be harmful.  Many of them serve a useful and definite purpose.  The 
weak and ailing furnish a fertile field, however, for mechanical 
devices represented as potent in the treatment of many conditions for 
which there is no effective mechanical cure.  The need for legal control 
                                                 
 17. OSCAR E. ANDERSON, THE HEALTH OF A NATION: HARVEY W. WILEY 
AND THE FIGHT FOR PURE FOOD 1-16 (University of Chicago Press, 1958). 
 18. Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768, 768-
72 (1906) (repealed 1938). 
 19. Since 1820, the USP has set standards for medications used by the 
American public.  It is an independent, nonprofit corporation composed of 
delegates with expertise in medicine.  The 1906 law recognized the USP 
standards.  Proprietary drugs are those sold directly to the public, and they 
include patent medicines.  The term proprietary indicates that the ingredients 
are secret, not that they are patented.  See generally USP Website, at 
http://www.usp.org/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2005). 
 20. David F. Cavers, The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its 
Legislative History and Its Substantive Provisions, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
2, 15-16 (1939). 
 21. See id. at 2, 3 n.9.   
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of devices of this type is self-evident . . . . The new statute, if enacted, 
will bring such products under the jurisdiction of the law.22 
There was heated Congressional debate over how to define 
drugs and devices.  An early Senate bill would have defined 
drugs to include all substances, preparations and devices 
“intended for use in the cure, mitigation, treatment or 
prevention of disease.”23  When this language was debated in 
the Senate, there was no objection to regulation of devices, but 
instead controversy about defining them as drugs.  One Senator 
argued that to treat devices as drugs “in law and in logic and in 
lexicography is a palpable absurdity.”24 
The bill addressing concerns about drug and device 
authority languished in Congress until a drug disaster focused 
public attention.  The Massengill Company produced a liquid 
form of sulfanilamide, one of the new classes of sulfa drugs on 
the market.  The solution was toxic and one hundred people 
died after ingesting the elixir.25 
The resulting legislation responded to the public pressure 
for reform, and set drugs and devices on different pathways 
from a regulatory perspective.  The 1938 law specifically 
defined “new drugs” as distinct from drugs, and expanded the 
FDA’s power over them.26  For the first time, the agency could 
subject “new drugs” to pre-market controls, rather than just the 
authority to seize misbranded or adulterated products.27  The 
legislation also defined medical devices for the first time.28  
However, by definition they were not “new drugs” so the pre-
market authority did not apply.29  Medical devices were now 
                                                 
 22. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION,  13-14 (1933). 
 23. S. REP. NO. 493, at 2 (1934). 
 24. Bruce C. Davidson, Preventive “Medicine” for Medical Devices: Is 
Further Regulation Required?, 55 MARQ. L. REV. 405, 415 (1972) (quoting 
Senator Clark). 
 25. See Foote, Loops and Loopholes, supra note 13, at 106. 
 26. See Cavers, supra note 20, at 32-33, 40.  
 27. See id.  
 28. See id.  
 29. The definitions are as follows: 
The term “drug” means (A) articles recognized in the official United 
States Pharmacopoeia, official Homoeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the 
United States, or official National Formulary, or any supplement to 
any of them; and (B) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other 
animals; and (C) articles (other than food) intended to affect the 
structure or any function of the body of man or other animals; and (D) 
articles intended for use as a component of any article specified in 
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subject to regulation, but only to the provisions referring to 
adulteration and misbranding of products already on the 
market.30 
The pattern of careful definition of products by category 
and tailoring regulatory authority to these definitional 
distinctions emerged.  It was also clear that external pressure, 
often in the form of crises of some kind, helped to stir Congress 
into action. 
Another tragedy spurred major new drug legislation in 
1962.  In the 1950s, thalidomide, a sedative, was approved in 
Europe.31  Hundreds of pregnant women who took the drug 
gave birth to children with serious deformities.32  Although the 
drug was only approved for limited distribution in the United 
States, news of the link between thalidomide and the deformed 
children in Europe facilitated the passage of amendments to 
the FDCA that were pending at the time.33  Under the 1962 
amendments, requirements for pre-market drug approvals 
increased to include a finding of efficacy as well as safety.34  
These amendments put additional distance between the drug 
and the device authorities. 
 
                                                 
clause (A), (B), or (C). 
21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(2000). 
The term “device” (except when used in paragraph (n) of this section 
and in sections 331(i), 343(f), 352(c), and 362(c) of this title) means an 
instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in 
vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including any 
component, part, or accessory, which is  -- (1) recognized in the official 
National Formulary, or the United States Pharmacopoeia, or any 
supplement to them, (2) intended for the use in the diagnosis of 
disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or 
prevention of disease, in man or other animals, or (3) intended to 
affect the structure of any function of the body of man or other 
animals, and which does not achieve its primary intended purposes 
through chemical action within or on the body of man or other 
animals and which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the 
achievement of its primary intended purposes. 
Id. § 321(h) (2000). 
 30. See Cavers, supra note 20, at 31-37. 
 31. HARVEY TEFF & COLIN MUNRO, THALIDOMIDE: THE LEGAL 
AFTERMATH 1 (Saxon House, 1976). 
 32. Id. at 4-5. 
 33. Id. at 118-24. 
 34. Id. at 123. 
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B.  DEVICE REGULATION EXPANDS 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the medical device 
industry grew in size and the products grew in complexity.  
Examples include monitoring equipment in coronary care units, 
automated laboratory equipment, new implanted devices such 
as pacemakers, and a myriad of diagnostic and therapeutic 
instruments.35  During this period, the Bureau of Drugs 
continued to enforce both the drug and device provisions. 
Confronted with inadequate regulatory powers of the more 
complex medical devices, the FDA tried to stretch the limits of 
its authority by classifying some devices as drugs under the 
1962 law.  In 1968, the Second Circuit upheld the FDA’s 
classification of a nylon ligature loop and nylon locking disk 
used to tie off severed blood vessels during surgery as a drug.  
In AMP v. Gardner,36 the court broadly construed the definition 
of drug by emphasizing the public health goals of the law, 
holding that a medical product not generally recognized as safe 
and effective could be termed a “drug” and regulated as such.37  
In the next year, the Supreme Court also broadly construed the 
term “drug” to apply to an antibiotic disk in United States v. An 
Article of Drug . . . Bacto-Unidisk. . . .38  In Bacto-Unidisk, the 
Court concluded that the term “drug” was a legal term of art 
which could be “given a liberal construction consistent with the 
[FDCA’s] overriding purpose to protect the public health.”39 
There was growing legislative interest in expanding 
medical device regulation during the 1960s as recognition of 
the problems grew.  Court decisions had confused the situation 
for manufacturers who were uncertain about how their 
products would be regulated.40  Bills to expand device 
regulation had been introduced during both the Johnson and 
Nixon Administrations.41  In 1969, the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW), of which the FDA was a part, 
convened a study group to investigate the need for additional 
legislation.  Named the Cooper Committee, after Chairman Dr. 
                                                 
 35. Theodore Cooper, Device Legislation, 26 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 165, 
166 (1971). 
 36. 389 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 37. Id. at 829-31. 
 38. 394 U.S. 784 (1969). 
 39. Id. at 798. 
 40. Vincent A. Kleinfeld, Sterile Disposable and Other Therapeutic Devices 
and the Law, 27 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 19, 21 (1972). 
 41. See Cooper, supra note 35, at 169. 
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Theodore Cooper, the group advocated new legislation, 
including a system to classify devices based on risk. 
Seven years elapsed between the report of the Cooper 
Committee and the passage of the Medical Device Amendments 
(MDA) in 1976.  During that time, numerous bills were 
proposed and debated.  The controversies over intrauterine 
devices (IUDs) and extensive pacemaker recalls in the mid-
seventies42 stimulated public concern and legislative interest, 
much as the Elixir-Sulfanilamide disasters in 1938 and the 
thalidomide tragedy in 1962.43  The FDA began to position 
itself for potential legislation.  In 1971, the Office of Medical 
Devices was transferred from the Bureau of Drugs to the Office 
of the Associate Commissioner for Medical Affairs.44  Three 
years later, in 1974, responsibility for regulating devices was 
vested in a new Bureau of Medical Devices and Diagnostic 
Products, later renamed the Bureau of Medical Devices 
(BMD).45 
The MDA stepped up the regulatory authority over devices 
by providing “reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness” 
for all devices.46  Devices on the market the day the law passed 
included pre-1976 devices and devices later introduced which 
are similar or substantially equivalent to them, often called 
510(k)s after the section of the legislation which regulates 
them.  The new law distinguished between pre-1976 devices 
and devices first developed after the date the law passed.  
Congress described a classification scheme based on risk 
because of the variety of devices, ranging from simple tongue 
depressors to implantable cardiac pacemakers.  Class I devices 
consist of those generally considered to present no risks, Class 
II devices are those whose characteristics are well known so 
                                                 
 42. See DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION’S INVESTIGATION OF DEFECTIVE CARDIAC PACEMAKERS 
RECALLED BY THE GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 21 (1975); see generally 
Regulation of Medical Devices (Intrauterine Contraceptive Devices): Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the House Committee 
on Government Operations, 93rd Cong. (1973). 
 43. Foote, Loops and Loopholes, supra note 13, at 110-11. 
 44. Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of 
Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1803-04, n.157 (1996) (citing Peter 
Barton Hutt, A History of Government Regulation of Adulteration & 
Misbranding of Medical Devices, 44 Food Drug. Cosm. L.J. 99, 110-11 (1989).  
 45. Id.  The current name of the device authority is the Center for Devices 
& Radiological Health (CDRH). 
 46. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat 539, 
541 (1976) (current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-360k (2000)). 
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that safety and efficacy can be guaranteed through 
performance standards, and Class III devices are those whose 
safety and effectiveness are sufficiently uncertain that they 
cannot be determined without additional testing.  Only Class 
III devices must meet pre-market approval requirements 
equivalent to new drugs.  The law created a variety of 
regulatory pathways for medical devices, depending on how 
they were classified, when they were marketed, and their 
“equivalence” to products on the market when the law was 
passed. 
Some have argued that Congress had hoped that its 
revision of the device definitions would end the issue of 
whether a particular product was a drug or a device.  However, 
there were no mechanisms to resolve disputes in close cases.  
“Accordingly, there was a tendency . . . for the FDA to rule that 
a particular product was a drug rather than a device,” 
particularly if there was a combination of a drug and a device.  
The FDA took the position that although devices, as a matter of 
law, may not have those mechanisms of actions, there is 
nothing in the drug definition that restricts it to articles 
employing those mechanisms of action.47 
From 1906 until the 1980s, Congress periodically expanded 
the  FDA’s regulatory authority.  It did so through discrete 
legislation that focused on detailed definitions of new products, 
such as drugs, new drugs, devices, discrete classifications of 
devices, and so on.  The regulatory requirements followed the 
definitional categories.  When regulatory authority did not fit 
the risks as defined by the FDA, the agency tended to stretch 
the confines of the law to accommodate its regulatory 
preferences.  During this period, regulatory silos emerged to 
implement these very different legislative regimes.  The drug 
regulation was administered by the Center for Drug Evaluation 
and Research (CDER); the Center for Devices and Radiological 
Health (CDRH) managed devices. 
C.  BIOLOGICS REGULATION 
At this point in our narrative, it is important to turn 
attention to the evolution of the regulation of biologics.  
                                                 
 47. Rodney R. Munsey, Trends and Events in FDA Regulation of Medical 
Devices Over the Last Fifty Years, 50 Food & Drug L.J. 163, 169 n.30. (1995) 
(citing a letter from William Randolph, Acting Associate Commissioner for 
Regulatory Affairs to Luster J. Lifton in response to an inquiry regarding the 
regulatory status of a saline solution). 
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Biologics followed a parallel but separate track from drugs and 
devices.  The Biologics Act passed in 1902 in response to 
tetanus-causing microbes’ contamination of batches of smallpox 
vaccine and diphtheria antitoxin.  Biologics were defined as 
“any virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, or analogous 
product applicable to the prevention and cure of disease of 
man.”48  Chronologically, it was the first significant attempt to 
regulate medical technology, but its importance was obscured 
by the passage four years later of the Pure Food and Drugs Act 
of 1906. 
The focus of early biologics regulation was to prevent 
contamination during the manufacturing process, which was 
appropriate to the era when biologics were crude mixtures or 
biological extracts.49  The law required that a manufacturer 
obtain a license for its biologic product, properly label the 
product and submit to inspection of its facilities.  The initial 
authority to regulate was at the Treasury Department.  The 
regulatory power was transferred to the Hygienic Laboratory in 
1903, which later became the National Institutes of Health.50 
Biologics were clearly distinguished from categories of 
drugs, relatively simple molecules that are chemically 
synthesized or extracted from plant and other sources of very 
high level of purity.  However, despite the fact that the 
regulatory scheme, the responsible authority, and the products 
themselves differed from drugs, there were gray areas between 
these two categories.  The FDA assumed jurisdiction over 
insulin in 1941 and antibiotics in 1945, despite the fact that 
“[b]oth products, and insulin in particular, had more in 
common with biologics than they did with pharmacological 
preparations.”51 
The Biologics Act was revised in 1944 as part of the Public 
Health Service Act52 which added mandatory product licensure 
and specified the criteria for issuing license approvals.  
Additional changes occurred in biologics regulation in response 
to what was known as the “Cutter incident,” when a number of 
                                                 
 48. Biologics Act of 1902, ch. 1378, 32 Stat. 728, (1902) (current version at 
42 U.S.C. § 262 (2000)). 
 49. Gary E. Gamerman, Regulation of Biologics Manufacturing: 
Questioning the Premise, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 213, 216-20 (1994). 
 50. Id. at 218 n.26. 
 51. Id. at 219. 
 52. Public Health Service Act, ch. 373, § 351, 58 Stat. 682, 702 (1944) 
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2000)). 
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children contracted polio from a batch of polio vaccine produced 
by Cutter laboratories.53  The crisis was attributed to lax 
regulation and pressure at NIH to get the vaccine on the 
market.  One result was the creation of the NIH Division of 
Biological Standards (DBS), which Congress transferred to the 
FDA in 1972.  This unit eventually became the Center for 
Biologics Evaluation and Regulation (CBER). 
Like the tensions between drug and device regulation, 
there were gray areas in the definitional distinctions between 
drugs, devices, and biologics.  In the 1970s and 1980s, there 
was significant innovation in biopharmaceuticals that dissolved 
the traditional scientific boundaries among biologics, drugs and 
devices.  Examples include recombinant insulin, diagnostic 
monoclonal antibodies, and interferon.54  As one commentator 
noted, “[d]istinguishing the jurisdictional status of many 
biologics from traditional drug and device products became 
difficult for both the FDA and industry because some products 
had characteristics which met multiple statutory and scientific 
definitions.”55 
By 1980, the FDA had three silos for regulating medical 
products- drugs, devices, and biologics.  There were gray areas 
at the margins.  The carefully crafted definitions often did not 
fit some innovations or the agency has to stretch its authority 
to regulate products.  Inter-center rivalry and cultural 
traditions influenced the agency’s assessments.56  The 
perception was that CDER played a dominant role among the 
Centers and exercised greater influence over the decisions.  If a 
medical device had drug characteristics, it could get delayed 
due to the request for drug expert consultations or subjected to 
additional, often unexpected regulatory hurdles.57  The 
regulatory process required the manufacturers to navigate 
through a maze of definitional and substantive hurdles, with 
significant differences in requirements based on how the 
product was ultimately classified. 
                                                 
 53. HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 13, at 517-18. 
 54. Gamerman, supra note 49, at 221. 
 55. Id. at 221 n.53 (citing Assignment of Agency Component for Review of 
Premarket Applications, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,754 (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 3 
(1991))). 
 56. Kshitij Mohan, Combination Products: Incrementalism Won’t Work, 
MED. DEVICE AND DIAGNOSTIC INDUSTRY, May 2002, at 3, available at 
http://www.devicelink.com/mddi/archive/02/05/017.html. 
 57. Id. at 2.   
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Before turning our attention to the FDA’s recent 
approaches to combination products, it is important to note 
that the major legislation on FDA issues in the last twenty 
years has not disrupted the three silos created through the 
evolutionary process described above.  This is true despite 
major shifts in the political environment.  The Safe Medical 
Devices Act of 199058 expanded the FDA’s enforcement and 
reporting authority without changing the Center structure.  
The FDA Modernization Act, passed after significant attacks on 
the FDA’s consumer protection mission by the Republican 
Congress in 1995 and 1996, streamlined regulatory processes 
without changing the presumptions about the FDA’s 
authority.59  Two user fee bills, one for drugs in 1992 (PDUFA), 
followed ten years later by one for devices (MDUFMA), 
increased the funds available for FDA approvals through 
assessments on regulated entities, also without changing the 
fundamental regulatory structure.60 
At the agency level, this period included continued turf 
battles among the three medical products centers.  There was a 
perception among many that the CDER’s approach dominated 
and was treated as superior to the other centers.  The 1993 
Temple Commission, led by long-time FDA official Dr. Robert 
Temple, reported serious reservations about the Device 
Center’s scientific capabilities.61  According to FDA expert 
Richard A Merrill, the message implicit in Commissioner 
Kessler’s decision to authorize an inquiry into the device center 
processes was that they were not reliable and its personnel 
were not adequately trained.62  In 2003, a shake up at CBER 
resulted in the transfer of jurisdiction over a number of 
                                                 
 58. Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, § 16, 104 Stat. 
4511, 4526 (1990) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 353(g) (2000)). 
 59. See Larry Pilot & Daniel Waldmann, Food and Drug Administration 
Modernization Act of 1997: Medical Device Provisions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
267, 267, 272-74 (1998). 
 60. Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 (PDUFA), Pub. L. No. 102-
571, 106 Stat. 4491 (1992); Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 
2002 (MDUFMA), Pub. L. No. 107-250, 116 Stat. 1588 (2002). 
 61. See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE 
FOR CLINICAL REVIEW: BASED ON A REVIEW OF SELECTED MEDICAL DEVICE 
APPLICATIONS, reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF 
THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, LESS THAN THE SUM OF ITS 
PARTS: REFORMS NEEDED IN THE ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT, AND 
RESOURCES OF THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION’S CENTER FOR DEVICES 
AND RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, 103rd Cong., (Comm. Print 1993).   
 62. Merrill, supra note 44, at 1826. 
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biological products from CBER to CDER.63  During this period 
of political change, and challenges to the FDA from the left and 
the right, the three separate Centers have survived. 
III.  EVOLUTION OF COMBINATION PRODUCTS 
REGULATION 
The development of combination products regulation 
follows the same iterative and incremental pathway that we 
have seen in the areas of drugs, devices, and biologics. 
A.  SAFE MEDICAL DEVICES ACT INTRODUCES COMBINATION 
PRODUCTS 
The opportunity to obtain legislative guidance came in 
1990 as part of the Safe Medical Devices Act (SMDA).  During 
the 1980s, following the passage of the complex MDA in 1976, 
there was significant concern about the FDA’s implementation 
of the law, the challenges built into the law itself, and 
limitations on FDA authority in some areas.  The General 
Accounting Office (GAO) conducted a series of studies on FDA 
performance.64  In response, the FDA initiated a multi-phase 
Action Plan to improve its timeliness, effectiveness, and 
efficiency in drug review, and to improve its medical device 
program.65  Nevertheless, the drumbeat for legislation 
continued.  The House Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce 
issued a report finding significant failures at the FDA to 
implement the law.66  The Department of Health and Human 
                                                 
 63. See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION 
AND RESEARCH, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., TRANSFER OF 
THERAPEUTIC PRODUCTS. TO THE CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND 
RESEARCH, at  http://www.fda.gov/cber/transfer/transfer.htm (updated Sept. 
27, 2004).  The report lists the products types to be transferred along with the 
staff comprising CBER’s Office of Therapeutics Research and Review which 
transferred as well.  Id.  CDER created two new offices to accommodate the 
former CBER staff.  See id.  
 64. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONG., FED. 
REGULATION OF MEDICAL DEVICES -- PROBLEMS STILL TO BE OVERCOME 
(GAO/HRD-83-53, 1983); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE 
CHAIRMAN, COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS U.S. SENATE, MEDICAL 
DEVICES: EARLY WARNING OF PROBLEMS IS HAMPERED BY SEVERE 
UNDERREPORTING (GAO/PEMD-87-1, 1986). 
 65. U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., 
A PLAN FOR ACTION: PHASE II, at v-vi (1987). 
 66. HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. 
ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 98th Cong., MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATION: THE 
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Services (DHHS) developed a draft bill to make the device 
provisions more effective in 1985, and House Democrat Henry 
Waxman introduced H.R. 5516, Medical Device Improvements 
Act, in 1986.67  Waxman also co-sponsored H.R. 2595, Medical 
Device Improvements Act, with Energy and Commerce Chair 
John Dingell, on June 3, 1987.68  That bill died in the Senate in 
1988, and the Safe Medical Devices Act (SMDA) was introduced 
on August 2, 1989.69 
Combination product issues were not the primary concern 
of the House supporters and no provision related to 
combinations appeared in the House Report.  However, 
industry representatives were able to persuade the Senate 
supporters that combination product reviews were a problem 
that needed to be addressed.70  The Senate Report 
accompanying the bill noted the importance of combination 
products, including “devices impregnated with biologically-
active materials, medicated devices, implantable drug pumps 
and biological sensors, and therapeutic devices used in 
conjunction with drugs for the extra-corporeal treatment of 
diseases.”71 According to the report language, Sections 19 and 
20 in the Senate bill established “firm ground rules to direct 
products promptly to that part of the FDA responsible for 
reviewing the article that provides the primary mode of action 
of the combination product.”72  The Senate bill also altered the 
definitions of “drug” and “device” to accommodate the principles 
of allocation of combination products through primary mode of 
                                                 
FDA’S NEGLECTED CHILD 1-5 (Comm. Print 1983). 
 67. See Letter from Margaret M. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, to the Honorable Thomas P. O’Neill, Speaker of the House of 
Representatives (Apr. 17, 1985) (on file with author); H.R. 5516, 99th Cong. 
(1986). 
 68. H.R. 2595, 100th Cong. (1987). 
 69. After recounting the shortcomings of the FDA, the Honorable Henry 
A. Waxman stated “Mr. Speaker, I must note that we should not even be in 
the position of introducing further legislation with respect to the regulation of 
medical devices.  Throughout the last Congress, we worked closely with 
representatives of the medical device industry to fashion a compromise bill.”  
135 CONG. REC. E 2815 (1989) (statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman) 
(introducing H.R. 3095).  
 70. “Various persons from industry have expressed the view that a 
weakness in FDA’s premarket review process is the determination of how to 
regulate combination products.”  S. REP. NO. 101-513, at 43 (1990).  
 71. Id. 
 72. Id;  see also Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, § 
16, 104 Stat. 4526 (1990) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 353(g) (2000)). 
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action review.  The SMDA became law in 1990.73 
On November 21, 1991, the FDA published its final 
regulation on combination products pursuant to the SMDA.74  
The agency also developed inter-center agreements in order to 
clarify how the respective centers were to operate in allocating 
products based on an assessment of their primary mode of 
                                                 
 73. Section 19 amended the drug definition by deleting the words “but 
does not include devices or their components, parts, or accessories.”  See S. 
REP. NO. 101-513, at 43.  By deleting this language, a product whose primary 
mode of action is attributable to a drug, but has a device component, may be 
reviewed under the Act’s drug authority.  Id.  In addition, the word “primary” 
in the device definition was substituted for the word “principal” to conform to 
the new concept of primary mode of action.  Id.  The new legislative language 
reads: 
(f)(1) The Secretary shall designate a component of the Food and Drug 
Administration to regulate products that constitute a combination of 
a drug, device, or biological product.  The Secretary shall determine 
the primary mode of action of the combination product.  If the 
Secretary determines that the primary mode of action is that of – “(A) 
a drug (other than a biological product), the persons charged with 
premarket review of drugs shall have primary jurisdiction, (B) a 
device, the persons charged with premarket review of devices shall 
have primary jurisdiction, or (C) a biological product, the persons 
charged with premarket review of biological products shall have 
primary jurisdiction. (2) Nothing in this subsection shall prevent the 
Secretary from using any agency resources of the Food and Drug 
Administration necessary to ensure adequate review of the safety, 
effectiveness, or substantial equivalence of an article. (3) The 
Secretary shall promulgate regulations to implement market 
approval procedures in accordance with paragraphs (1) and (2) not 
later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this subsection. 
S. REP. NO. 101-959, at 17 (1990). 
 74. Definition of a Combination Product: 
A product comprised of two or more regulated components, i.e., 
drug/device, biologic/device, drug/biologic, or drug/device/biologic, that 
are physically, chemically, or otherwise combined or mixed and 
produced as single entity; (2) Two or more separate products 
packaged together in a single package or as a unit and comprised of 
drug and device products, device and biological products, or biological 
and drug products; (3) A drug, device, or biological product packaged 
separately that according to its investigational plan or proposed 
labeling is intended for use only with an approved individually 
specified drug, device, or biological product where both are required to 
achieve the intended use, indication, or effect and where upon 
approval of the proposed product the labeling of the approved product 
would need to be changed, e.g., to reflect a change in intended use, 
dosage form, strength, route of administration, or significant change 
in dose; or (4) Any investigational drug, device, or biological product 
packaged separately that according to its proposed labeling is for use 
only with another individually specified investigation drug, device, or 
biological product where both are required to achieve the intended 
use, indication, or effect. 
21 C.F.R. § 3.2(e) (2004). 
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action.75 
The allocation process follows the iterative path we have 
described in our discussion of the evolution of drug, device and 
biologics previously.  In this case, Senate bill recognized the 
difficulty of determining the jurisdictional base for regulating 
combination products.76  It focused on defining terms and the 
allocation process.77  The final bill did not disrupt the three 
silos that the Centers represent.  Instead, the role of the 
allocation process is to establish “firm ground rules” to place a 
combination product into one of the three silos.78 
Despite the legislative success in the SMDA, innovators in 
the field of combination products continued to experience 
challenges at the FDA.79  The FDA acknowledged stakeholder 
issues including: 
concerns about the consistency, predictability, and transparency of 
the process used to assign an FDA Center with primary responsibility 
for review and regulation . . ., issues related to the management of the 
review process when two (or more ) FDA Centers have review 
responsibilities for a combination product; lack of clarity about the 
postmarket regulatory controls applicable to combination products; 
and lack of clarity regarding certain agency policies, such as when 
applications to more than one Center are needed.80   
Agency efforts did not resolve these issues, leading to 
pressure to formalize the allocation process.81  Legislative 
authority was sought legislative authority to accomplish the 
task.82 
The vehicle for this effort was the medical device user fee 
legislation that Congress had been considering for years.  In 
2002, Congress passed the Medical Devices User Fee and 
                                                 
 75. See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., INTERCENTER AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN THE CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH AND THE 
CENTER FOR DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH (1991), at 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/ombudsman/drug-dev.htm. 
 76. S. REP. NO. 101-513, at 30 (1990).  
 77. Id.  
 78. Id.  See Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, 104 
Stat. 4511 (1990) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 353(g) (2000)). 
 79. OFFICE OF COMBINATION PRODS., U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., DEP’T 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: FEDERAL FOOD, 
DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT AS AMENDED BY THE MEDICAL DEVICE USER FEE 
AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2002, at 4-5 (2003). 
 80. Id.  
 81. See id.  
 82. See id.  
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Modernization Act (MDUFMA) of 2002.83  MDUFMA also 
amended section 503(g) of the FDCA.84  A provision in the bill 
modified definitions to specifically direct assignment to an 
agency center pursuant to new procedures.85  These included 
the establishment of a new Office of Combination Products 
(OCP) within the office of the Commissioner to ensure prompt 
assignment and effective review, resolve disputes, and report 
on the impact of the office including the numbers and types of 
combinations, review times and improvements in consistency.86  
With congressional directives in place, the challenge of 
combination products was once again in the hands of the 
FDA.87 
B.  PRIMARY MODE OF ACTION 
The key challenge was to operationalize SMDA’s “primary 
mode of action” language.  On May 7, 2004, the FDA issued a 
Proposed Rule, “Definition of Primary Mode of Action of a 
Combination Product.”88  The proposed rule is “intended to 
promote the public health by codifying the agency’s criteria for 
the assignment of combination products in transparent, 
consistent, and predictable terms.”89  As of this writing, the 
proposed rule is still pending.90  Although the rule is not final, 
the language of the proposal, as well as the comments from 
interested parties, provides insight into the goals of the agency, 
and into the views of many drug, device and biologics 
manufacturers on this issue. 
The FDA notes that “primary mode of action” (PMOA) is 
not defined in the statute or regulations, and may be difficult to 
identify by either the FDA or the product sponsor at the time 
assignment is being considered.91  Accordingly, without clear 
                                                 
 83. Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-250, 116 Stat. 1588((2002). 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. 
 86. See 21 U.S.C. §353(g) (2000). 
 87. Product Jurisdiction, 21 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-3.10 (2003). 
 88. Definition of Primary Mode of Action of a Combination Product, 69 
Fed. Reg. 25,527 (proposed May 7, 2004) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 3). 
 89. Id. 
 90. The original comment period was to close on July 6, 2004, but was 
extended to August 20, 2004.  See Definition of Primary Mode of Action of a 
Combination Product, 69 Fed. Reg. 35,277 (June 24, 2004). 
 91. Definition of Primary Mode of Action of a Combination Product, 69 
Fed. Reg. at 25,527.  
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definitions of “mode of action” and “primary mode of action,” 
the assignment process may “appear to be unpredictable.”92  
The rule also sets forth a two-tiered assignment algorithm to 
use to determine assignment in some circumstances.93  The 
proposed rule defines “mode of action” as “the means by which 
a product achieves a therapeutic effect” and “primary mode of 
action” as “the single mode of action of a combination product 
that provides the most important therapeutic action of the 
combination product.”94  If the agency cannot determine the 
primary mode of action, the assignment algorithm would 
apply.95  The next step asks: is there an agency component that 
regulates other combination products that present similar 
questions of safety and effectiveness with regard to the 
combination as a whole?96  If not, the question becomes, 
“[w]hich agency component has the most expertise related to 
the most significant safety and effectiveness questions 
presented by the product?”97 
Interested manufacturers, trade associations, and 
professional organizations submitted comments to the proposed 
rule.98  While most of the comments welcomed the effort and 
offered specific responses, a consistent theme emerges.  There 
is concern, expressed in different ways, that the FDA not 
deviate from the terms of the statute (both SMDA and 
MDFUMA), and respect prior assignment precedents.99  For 
example, the National Electrical Manufacturers Association“ 
states that: 
the proposed rule, with its creation of an algorithm for determination 
of the appropriate Center to assign a combination product, would, if 
adopted, violate the intent of Congress expressed in MDUFMA by 
introducing two criteria for assignment of a combination product 
which were not included within the statute when it was enacted.100 
                                                 
 92. Id. at 25,528.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. at 25,529.  
 96. Id.  
 97. Definition of Primary Mode of Action of a Combination Product, 69 
Fed. Reg. at 25,530. 
 98. There are twelve posted comments available on the FDA Dockets site.  
FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., COMMENTS ON DEFINITION OF PRIMARY MODE OF 
ACTION OF A COMBINATION PRODUCT DOCKET  2004 N-0194, at 
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ FDARULE/2004npr.htm#august2004 (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2004). 
 99. Id.  
 100. Letter from Robert G. Britain, Vice President, Medical Products, 
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Smith and Nephew Wound Management expresses concern 
about agency discretion: “[w]ithout appropriate statutory 
redefinitions, we believe the proposed rule could allow 
assignment of jurisdiction of new technologies based solely on 
FDA preference particularly where it determines the product 
raises new questions of safety and effectiveness.”101  The 
comments of Cook, a large holding company of device 
manufacturers, urge fidelity to SMDA’s “firm ground rules” for 
assignment.102  Cook notes that the agency “must revisit the 
law and adjust its proposal to effect the efficient, transparent 
and well-defined process that Congress envisioned.”103 
These comments imply that the FDA is “stretching” the 
scope of its jurisdiction to expand its discretion to assign based 
on factors the commentors judge to be inappropriate under the 
law.  The final rule has not been issued, so it remains to be 
seen whether the agency will pursue this arguably broader 
interpretation or if it will retreat in a direction the industry 
commentors appear to prefer.  Whatever the outcome of this 
effort, however, the pattern documented here holds.  In the 
fourteen years since the first statutory reference to combination 
products, there have been incremental efforts to respond to new 
combinations, legislative redefinition of terms, and new 
procedural directions, and now challenges to the agency’s 
interpretation of its authority. 
IV.  POLICY ANALYSIS 
Combination products continue to present challenges to the 
regulatory structure of the FDA.  How to regulate innovative 
combinations raises issues that are similar to those that arose 
                                                 
National Electrical Manufacturers Association, to Food and Drug 
Administration, Division of Documents Management, Re: Docket No 2004N-
0194 (Aug. 17, 2004), at 
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/04/aug04/082304/04N-0194-
emc00002-01.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2005). 
 101. Letter from Ronald S. Warren, Executive Director, Smith & Nephew 
Wound Management, to Food and Drug Administration, Division of Dockets 
Management, Re: Docket No. 2004N-0194 (Aug. 18, 2004), at 
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/04/aug04/082404/04n-0194-c00009-
vol1.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2005). 
 102. Letter from Stephen L. Ferguson, Executive Vice President and 
Chairman of the Board, Cook Group, Inc., to Food and Drug Administration, 
Division of Dockets Management, Re: Docket No. 2004N-0194 (Aug. 20, 2004), 
at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/04/aug04/082404/04n-0194-c00005-
vol1.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2005). 
 103. Id.  
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around the emergence of innovative drugs, devices, and 
biologics in the last century.  The public policy response to 
combination products to date has followed predictable patterns.  
Congress defines the new product and sets specific structures 
and pathways for the FDA to implement.  The FDA interprets 
its authority, designs regulatory guidelines, through rules, 
guidances, and other directives.  The process is clearly reactive 
to innovation.  It is incremental in approach, focusing on 
problems that have been identified and experienced, rather 
than proactive and broad.  It is slow by nature.  It has been 
fourteen years since Congress first defined combination 
products.  Since that time, there have been two legislative 
initiatives and a host of regulatory responses.  The rule 
defining a PMOA is pending.  New guidances have recently 
been issued.  Some in industry have called for a re-definition of 
terms.  The process continues. 
While the process has been incremental, reactive, and slow, 
it also has merit in that it is generally predictable.  Regulated 
entities whose efforts to develop new products span years and 
constitute large investments value predictability in the 
regulatory process.  While the numbers of combination 
products have remained manageable,104 it is possible that an 
onslaught of unique and novel combinations will further 
challenge the current regulatory scheme.  Can the current 
regulatory process withstand these forces?  What are the policy 
alternatives? 
A.  STATUS QUO APPROACH 
The status quo approach involves accepting the traditional 
historical pattern.  One can predict that the FDA will labor to 
provide guidance on implementation based on what is currently 
known about combinations.  It may try to “stretch” its authority 
to adapt to uncertainties in the future, such as the effort to 
design an algorithm for products for which the primary mode of 
action is not known.  Turf battles among the centers will 
continue.  But it is likely that new products will emerge that do 
not fit the current structure and will challenge the OCP’s 
efforts. At that point, expect industry to go back to the 
Congressional drawing board, so to speak, to urge a legislative 
tweak of the definitions and further refine the terms.  If the 
innovative process accelerates the way some predict, this policy 
                                                 
 104. See OFFICE OF COMBINATION PRODS., supra note 12. 
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cycle will always be behind the innovation curve.  As Dr. 
Kshitij Mohan, a former FDA official and industry executive 
noted,  
Much of this effort is like measuring length to the fourth decimal 
place with a crooked ruler.  The danger is that the traditional way of 
dealing with such complexity will make the process even more 
complex.  A new maze of regulations, guidelines, and guidance memos 
could be the result.105 
B.  ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE STATUS QUO 
One alternative to the status quo is to declare that all 
combination products will follow the regulatory pathway of one 
of three existing centers.  Some medical device innovators have 
suggested a presumption in favor of the device laws, which they 
argue are more flexible and adaptable than those that apply to 
drugs or biologics.  Drug or biological expertise could be 
acquired or imported to CDRH as needed.  This solution retains 
the three centers and allows firm ground rules and 
predictability by applying one center’s jurisdiction.  However, 
given the history of inter-center rivalry, the perception that 
drug regulation is more protective and CDER has more 
expertise, and the fact that many combinations are primarily 
drugs or biologics, there is likely to be resistance to this 
alternative within the agency and among drug and biologic 
firms. 
Another alternative is to abandon the effort to shoehorn 
innovations into one of the three silos, pursuant to the SMDA 
and MDUFMA directives, and create a new Center for 
Combination Products.  This may be a natural extension of the 
historical pattern and, indeed, new types of products did find 
their way into new centers over time.  Creating a new center 
would require legislative action.  There would be new 
challenges to overcome with this approach.  Deciding what 
would be the appropriate regulatory pathway would still 
involve choosing attributes from the various product-specific 
centers and borrowing or acquiring a broad range of expertise, 
much of it located elsewhere.  Combinations are not as tidily 
discrete as drugs, devices or biologics.  A fourth silo could 
complicate the process and undermine efforts at predictability.  
It could also exacerbate the legislative “crazy quilt” with “a 
bounty of approaches, with each patch of authority a little, or a 
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lot, different from the others.”106 
C.  ABANDON THE CENTERS CONCEPT 
A bolder and clearly controversial step would be to 
abandon the complex “crazy quilt” of three centers and move to 
a more flexible approach.  This “innovative” approach would 
allow for adaptation to new products in creative ways.  This 
approach would require a major sea change in the historical 
relationship of the institutions of government and with the 
regulated entities. 
Congress has traditionally limited FDA discretion through 
very specific and detailed legislative mandates.  The FDA often 
has been under fire with Congress, although the fire varies 
depending on the politics of the time.  During the debates over 
the SMDA in the 1980s, former Democratic Congressman Paul 
Rogers wrote:  
[t]he philosophy behind the writing of the Medical Device 
Amendments was to be so specific in language that less discretion 
was left to the agency—a first step in the trend in the Congress to 
make clear that Congress wanted the agencies to follow the 
Congressional mandate more carefully and not go off on bureaucratic 
binges pursuing bureaucratic whims.107 
During the debates over FDAMA in the 1990s, the 
Republican majority criticized the FDA for not responding more 
vigorously to industry needs.108  At various times, both parties 
have been inclined to distrust agency discretion and guide the 
FDA with specific and highly detailed legislation.  In 2004, 
Senate Republican Finance Committee Chairman Charles 
Grassley called for hearings to determine if the FDA was too 
lax in its oversight of Merck’s drug Vioxx. 109  This is an 
example of a Republican leader calling the agency to account 
for alleged laxity in regulatory oversight. 
The manufacturers of medical products have not shown an 
inclination to support agency discretion either.  If the 
comments filed in response to the proposed PMOA rule are any 
indication, yearnings for flexibility are offset by distrust of the 
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agency’s exercise of discretion.  As we discussed earlier, many 
of the industry comments specifically took the FDA to task for 
broadly construing its own authority.110 
Will the FDA press for more discretion?  The FDA is a 
creature of Congress and subject to its oversight.  Exercise of 
discretion can be risky; caution may be its preferred state.  On 
occasion, FDA commissioners have taken risks.  Commissioner 
David Kessler aggressively interpreted FDA authority to 
regulate tobacco as a drug (and cigarettes as drug delivery 
devices) during his tenure.111  He boldly set out to do so and 
enacted a rule asserting authority to regulate tobacco.112  The 
tobacco industry challenged his efforts as outside the scope of 
the FDA’s authority and on other grounds.113  The U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld the industry’s challenge and the rule 
was struck down.114 
The courts have upheld broad FDA discretion, but only 
when Congress has been silent or ambiguous.115  Jeffrey E. 
Shuren, a former FDA official, has forcefully argued for broad 
FDA discretion.116  He contends that “courts should grant 
sufficient deference to agencies’ modifications of prior statutory 
interpretations in order to ensure adequate agency flexibility to 
meet new challenges within existing statutory delegations of 
authority.”117 
Congress is not likely to confer broad discretion.  Even 
conservatives and liberals have shown distrust of the FDA.  It 
would take a very creative Congress, supported by a willing 
industry, and backed by generous judicial interpretations, to 
change the course of the FDA’s history.  There is no evidence in 
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the past or present to make this option likely. 
CONCLUSION 
At the outset, we asked: “Can Regulation be as Innovative 
as Science and Technology?”  The answer to the question is no.  
There appears to be little appetite to confer upon the FDA the 
discretion and flexibility to respond creatively to combination 
products, or other novel and as yet unforeseen innovations in 
the future.  The history of the FDA is one of iterative, 
incremental changes through carefully defined legislative 
distinctions and highly specific regulatory pathways.  Politics 
and administrative law are likely to prevent the FDA from 
being a bold innovator. 
One could argue, however, that our system does not favor 
innovation in regulatory agencies, even as it is embraced in our 
scientists and engineers.  Innovators and the manufacturers of 
innovations want regulatory predictability and certainty.  They 
appear to be willing to sacrifice speed and flexibility in 
exchange.  Given the nature of our policy environment and our 
political preferences, regulators will surely follow the scientific 
innovators, not lead them. 
 
